Read more

Read more

» Jaminvest resources

• Financial models/templates/et cetera

• Portfolio posts

• Stock/Company list, updated until 2025/12/02

• Tutorials

» Table of Contents

1. Portfolio updates

   1. Aegon

   2. Herbalife

      1. Inflection building credibility…

      2. Once upon a time…

      3. The happy end?

      4. What else?

      5. Further reading

      6. Risks/Negatives

2. Portfolio

3. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

4. Malaysia (sub-)portfolio (soft launch)

5. Footnotes

1. Portfolio updates

In this post, I am zooming in a bit on the insurer Aegon and more so on Herbalife, before showing the updated portfolio tables.

1.a. Aegon

I introduced Aegon as follows…

Aegon was overly complex and too aggressively managed. That’s been changing with the arrival of the successful CEO, Lard Friese, from yet another Dutch insurer NN. My original attraction to Aegon was also the ‘promise’ of a high (single-digit %) dividend yield on cost price, and the prospect that Aegon would become a simpler, more boring and more predictable business. Friese has not disappointed thusfar. He sold many business units - amongst which Aegon Nederland to ASR, building a national champion - strengthened the balance sheet, increased the dividend (again), and bought back a ton of shares.

I have not put any attention on Aegon in my posts simply because I would not buy the shares myself around the current levels. The best entry points for both Aegon and ASR Nederland are usually in times of general market distress… as they are for all stocks of course, but with these type of stocks it allows you to lock-in substantial dividend yields. For the 2025 financial year, I am expecting c15% dividend yield for ASR and c9% for Aegon, at my cost price, and… I am expecting further growth in those dividends.

So why am I breaking the silence on Aegon now?

Well, the Capital Markets Day is coming up shortly, on 2025/12/10, and I am expecting further progression in the company’s transition towards a simple, boring, dividend-paying, cannibal. This financial year, 2025, marks the end of the prior multi-year strategic plan. Given the direction of the company and the recent commentary, it seems likely that the long-term idea is to strictly focus on the U.S. insurance activities. That would imply selling off the other activities, such as the UK, (the joint-ventured) Spanish and Chinese insurance activities, the asset management business, and the c23.6% interest in ASR Nederland (which is worth about EUR 2.8bn or c26% of Aegon’s market cap), and returning loads of additional cash to shareholders through buybacks and dividends.

The Board has already retired over 22% of the share count since the start of the buybacks, and there is still plenty of firepower to do more, both through the annual excess capital generation as well as over-capitalization. On the latter, management aims to reduce cash in the Holding to the midpoint of the EUR 0.5-1bn target range by the end of 2026, from EUR 1.9bn at 2025/09/30.

1.b. Herbalife 🏷️

1.b.i Inflection building credibility…

A picture can sometimes say more than a thousand words… So here goes!

Chart - Google Trends: Interest over time… 10-years…

… and 5-years (excluding Ozempic)…

and 1-year (excluding Ozempic)…

Okay, I cheated! … three pictures, this time. In any case, it is clear that the mass popularity of GLP-1 weight loss drugs (vizualized by Ozempic in the first picture) put huge pressure on the sales of traditional weight loss product/service companies. However, where many of Herbalife’s traditional competitors have been destroyed by the advent of GLP-1 weight loss drugs, search interest for Herbalife has been relatively stable, and… the company just squeezed out its first quarter of year-over-year (yoy) revenue growth in the U.S., since… 2021, and… that is even BEFORE the rollout of many of the company’s new initiatives under new CEO, Stephan Gratziani, and… Nevertheless, Herbalife trades at only 5x EV/EBITDA (on USD 645-655m guidance).

Anyway, I believe the recent developments at Herbalife suggest that the investment case from 2025/08/24 (f🔐) is on track…

I am counting on revenue and profit stabilization (if not improvement), and further debt reductions. That should be enough to re-rate the P/E multiple higher.

… and it seems the turnaround is gaining credibility with other investors…

Share price charts Herbalife - all-time (left), and three-months (right)…

…although, the recent share price increase was likely considerably influenced by technical factors (= short-covering), and may very well correct again, shortly.

1.b.ii Once upon a time…

The beauty about Herbalife is that it is one of the best staples business models I know. Yes, yes, yes, I understand it hasn’t been looking like it, but… just think about it.

Which staples company wouldn’t die to have…

• a strong brand, with global distribution power, …

  

• an increasingly loyal distributor (and customer base)…

  

• customers consuming the products on a regular, and often, daily basis…

  

• tons of customer data, enabling a personalized offering… and all that, with…

  

• asset-light operations, generating high returns on invested capital (ROIC) and strong free cash flow (FCF) (at sufficient scale)

  

  • Q:» What the heck, Jam, your chart stops in 2021!?! Have you been living under a rock for the last 4 years?!?

  • A Jam:» Aahhhh, yes. Thanks for noticing. As a matter of fact, I did not count on re-visiting Herbalife again... So, I stopped monitoring the business more intensily around that time. So, do be mindful that the economics took another step-down after 2021, but… it does currently look like the economics can return to 2021 levels, excluding any acquisition impacts (which tend to be small).

  • Q:» The Starbucks series already stops in 2019…

  • A Jam:» …

    

    I’ll give you the relative share price performance. Happy?

    Share price performance: Herbalife (orange) vs Starbucks (blue)…

    

    …

  Chart: Operating cash flows (OCF) vs Capex intensity…

  

Heck, this may as well be a better business model than Starbucks, without the annoying customers who stick around behind their laptop the whole day, while consuming only 1 single drink…

No, not you, lady!

… occupying tables for the real customers, while they’re at it!

So yes, Herbalife may very well be a better business model than Starbucks…

It’s just operating in a product category that has been much, much more challenging, due to the competitive disruption by GLP-1 drugs.

Sure, it has NOT looked like Herbalife’s business model is that great for a while, but it was actually a PHENOMENAL business, back before the mid-2010’s, when…

• The investigation by, and settlement agreement with, the Federal Trade Commission increased the cost base. The settlement agreement led management to make changes in the business model to demonstrate that Herbalife is not a pyramid scheme sales to end-consumers.

  

• Several South American Markets went through a rough period. The resulting sales weakness was exacerbated on Herbalife’s profitability due to exports from the U.S.

  Chart: USD/BRL currency (left), South & Central America revenue (right)…

  

… and then of course in the post covid years, Herbalife incurred more headwinds…

• The end of the covid pandemic era work-from-home trend, resulted in the loss of a big cohort of new customers that came in during the 2020-2022 period (gently highlighted in RED in the charts below).

  Charts: Herbalife - Volume points (left), and Medifast - Coach # (right)

  

• Debt worries surfaced due to the combo of deteriorating results, and an elevated debt burden which funded shareholder-requested share repurchases, especially by Uncle Carl. Like this one…

  

• The mass adoption of GLP-1 weight loss drugs put further pressure on sales

  

  

• USD strengthening and rising interest rates

…

1.b.iii The happy end?

Well, I am thinking that we have already seen the peak competitive impact of GLP-1 drugs in the U.S. Despite their broad availability, US (and global) sales have been quite stable for a while now…

… and many of the company’s growth initiative under the new CEO have yet to kick in.

So, what could a happy end look like? Well, in financial terms, CFO John DeSimone has communicated he wants to reduce debt by USD 1bn by the end of 2028. That would imply gross debt of around USD 1.4bn and net debt around USD 1bn

From the 2025/11/05 earnings call…

We remain committed to reducing our gross debt to $1.4 billion by the end of 2028, a $1 billion reduction from the end of the second quarter of last year when we first made the commitment.

Our priorities are pretty well laid out. One is support the new strategy of the business. Two is continue to pay down debt. We want to get our net debt down to under $1 billion, which is really getting our gross debt down to $1.4 billion by the end of 2028. That’s our goal.

The debt reduction target is an ambitious one, given the USD 200m+ annual free cash flow (perhaps a bit less, if we were to deduct share-based compensation) that Herbalife is tracking for, but… a return to sales growth, a rebound in profit margins (both helped by this year’s weakening of the USD), and re-financing of punitively expensive debt should provide a nice boost to cash generation.

In the first half of 2026, the USD 800m in 12.25%(!!) Senior Secured Notes due 2029/04/15, become callable. Just using one year of FCF to pay off USD 200m worth of debt already saves USD 24.5m per year. However, Herbalife will likely try to re-finance the whole bond, accelerating the interest expense reductions.

On top of that all, the multi-year capex program is about to finish. As of 2024/12/31, Herbalife had already spent USD 300m out of the USD 400m multi-year Digital Technology Program that is focused on enhancing and rebuilding its member-facing technology platform and web-based member tools to provide enhanced digital capabilities and experiences. This is also referred to as Herbalife One.

Anyways, I don’t think it is very crazy to assume USD 200-300m in annual free cash flow. That provides a very nice 14-21% yield on the current USD 1.4bn market cap (103.2m shares + USD 13.34 share price), or about 8-12% on enterprise value, once the company reaches the USD 1bn net debt target, and… we KNOW what the Board is going to do with those cash flows down the road…

I am thinking that shares of Herbalife may be going to go extinct.

…

1.b.iv What else?

There is of course much more to the Herbalife story, and it is best to hear it straight from the horses mouth…

CEO, Stephan Gratziani…

And so number one, special company, 45 years, over 2 million distributors, 60,000-plus nutrition clubs, physical brick-and-mortar locations around the world. We are different than, I would say, every other company in the direct sales channel. We are not only bigger, we’re diversified and we have probably the largest network effect and more reach than any other company in the world.

Now having said that, we are a direct sales company. And that is a super power when it comes to selling products to people that are going to be ingesting something, changing some behavior that’s going to help them to become healthier and having the support of a coach, a distributor, someone that cares about them, this is something that’s very special to Herbalife.

What we’re doing as a company is we are technically and technologically enabling our distributors, aggregating personal data information supported by AI and analytics, personalizing and empowering support through technology in a way with the things that we’re launching, the new coach dashboards to be able to give distributors even more capability of following up their customers and helping them reach their goals than they’ve ever had in the past, delivering tools for all of those 2 million-plus distributors to go out and build bigger businesses like the sales funnels and the functionalities that we’re delivering now that we’ve just launched for our distributors in beta.

Then you think about personalized curated products and solutions. Herbalife, this huge network, the quality, the science, the innovative products and we have been doing that for 45 years. We offer a personal solution through a personal coach and distributor supporting someone and we’re about to take that to the next level and move from curated to actually formulate it.

The 2025/06/04 MicroCap Rodeo fireside chat with CFO John DeSimone in the Quartr app helps as well. In case you don’t want to read/listen (to) the whole call, there are some highlights in footnote 1.

More recently, on 2025/11/24, there was a webcast of a fireside chat between John DeSimone and David Dai (Manatuck Hill Partners, a shareholder). The transcript is also available, here. Some of the highlights from that chat include background on…

• New company initiatives…

  • New distributors, new training, new technology, new product

  • App launch US/Mexico/Canada next month, also creating a new subscription-based income stream

  • The digitization of personal health

• Financial de-leverage, opportunity to re-finance 12% interest rate debt in early 2026

Extracts

• 2025/08/14 - Water Tower Research fireside chat with John DeSimone (CFO) 2

• 2025/09/02 - Barclays Consumer conference fireside chat with Stephan Gratziani (CEO) and John DeSimone (CFO) 3

…

1.b.v Further reading

• 2013/01/16 - Bronte Capital: Notes on visiting an Herbalife nutrition club in Queens

  This club was not a club selling diet drinks (but it clearly did that). It was a club selling the social support group necessary to drink diet drinks. These diet drinks work (especially when combined with a modicum of exercise). What happens though is that normal people do not have the will-power to maintain a diet drink and exercise regime.

  In the richer-parts of our society we have a solution to diet-and-exercise will-power problem. We hire a personal trainer (usually someone cheerful, younger and good looking) and they cajole us into weight-loss. This is a “for-hire” personal support group.

• 2015/06/11 - Bronte Capital: Herbalife - the (very) long post

  The members meet every (almost) every evening and have a similar process:

  1. Drink the shake (the food) – which costs around 12 shekel.

  2. Drink a Herbalife tea.

  3. Drink water with Aloe Vera.

  This whole meal costs 18 shekel (USD4.70) which is cheap relative to the meal replaced. The club saves members money. [The meal being cheap relative to the meal replaced applies in most markets I have seen but not in China.]

  It is pretty obvious this is working really well.

  1. The clear results of the program – they really lose weight and become non-fat.

  2. The emotional support – this is the reason why one needs clubs – for the support – just like we see running teams. People do this better in a group than alone.

  3. Social. They become very close friends. The atmosphere was very open, and they get a chance to discuss their weakness (fat, loss of control) with no shame, because everyone has a similar problem.

  This is like the alcoholic groups or parents that meet for child treatments (e.g. ADD).

• 2024/12/04 - Water Tower Research: Initiation report (company-sponsored). NB, it is free-of-charge. You just need to register to access it.

• 2025/11/26 - ’s write-up on WW International / fka Weight Watchers also provides a good overview of some of the recent developments in the weight loss industry.

1.b.vi Risks/Negatives

• It’s a Pyramid scheme!!

  

  Now, seriously…

  Prior to the 2016 settlement with the US FTC, Herbalife and the entire direct selling industry transacted with its distributors and paid the compensation to distributors based off of purchases by distributors or by customers. It did not matter who purchased the product.

  In the 2016 FTC consent order, Herbalife agreed to pay distributors when that distributor sells the product to an end-user. After the initial rollout of this model in the US, Herbalife has been adopting this model in an increasing number of countries. As such, there can be no question about real end-customer demand, which should end the stories about pyramid schemes once and for all.

  …

  From 2024/12/10, John DeSimone…

  Now this is a U.S. initiative. So at all of our clubs in the U.S., we have POS systems that we built to see the transactions that take place at club level. And there’s lots of other measures we put in place to be able to determine when that product gets to the end user. What that effectively does is it eliminates the inventory loading risk.

• Customer habbits; Substitution of Herbalife weight-loss products for GLP-1 medication, or just any change in consumer habbits is one of the critical risks/threats to (any consumer) business. In the U.S. this impact has already been there for years now, but Herbalife may very well still be incurring an increasing impact from this trend in other countries.

  With the advent of GLP-1’s in the U.S., several once big weight loss names have evaporated; Weight Watchers and Optavia (Medifast $MED.us) are probably the best-know examples.

• Retention; Retention rates for weight loss products are obviously lower than for a staples products, such as Coca Cola or coffee. Plenty of people will stop consuming Herbalife product after they’ve reached their weight loss goal.

  Do note that Herbalife is hurting its own retention metrics, by forcing its Sales leaders to re-qualify at the start of each year…

  

  More about the Sales leader retention metric, in footnote4.

2. Portfolio

Read more

This could be another such stock. The ingredients…

• Highly recurring Gross profit stream

• Associates/JV’s have been swelling up with cash, causing…

• An AVALANCHE of cash distributions to the Holding co, equaling over two-thirds of the market cap of the company within a two year period

• Financial Assets Value exceeds the Market cap multifold

  • Net cash alone exceeds the Market cap more than two times

• The Owner/Operator has been consistently buying shares in the open market

• A substantial part of the Group is joint-owned with billion USD market cap co’s

… but of course a proper One-Day Stock is not a One-Day Stock unless it has proper catalysts…

• Next FY results should show an inflection to ‘normal’ profitability, because…

  • Prior results were heavily depressed by massive one-off impairment charges and operating losses in a non-core business

  • The non-core business operations have now been outsourced, cutting the losses to pretty much zero

• The upcoming profit inflection should visualize a very low P/E multiple, likely below 4x, and very possible close to 2x

• The Owner-Operator now owns a considerable part of the company, creating an incentive for improved capital allocation and/or a (mandatory) takeover offer down the line

• Some JAMagic helping fellow investors discover this Dollar trading for Pennies

This stock does require having a properly customer-friendly broker, like Futubull or Swissquote. It is available at IBKR, but… NOT available to buy for residents of US, Canada or Europe… and one of the reasons for that is that it is a TINY market cap co.

Jaminvest resources

Some useful links to key resources on Jaminvest.

• 🏷️ - Financial models/templates/et cetera (f🔐)

• 🏷️ - Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio posts

• 🏷️ - Portfolio posts (f🔐)

• » » - Stock/Company list, alphabetical lists of many of the stocks mentioned

• 🏷️ - Tutorials including Excel sheets

Read more

Table of Contents

1. Glass half FULL vs Glass half empty + ClearPoint Neuro

2. Jaminvest resources

3. Portfolio

4. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

5. Malaysia (sub-)portfolio (soft launch)

6. Footnotes

1. Glass half FULL vs Glass half empty

There are a lot of intellectual, psychological, and other challenges that make investing incredibly enjoyable, amusing, entertaining, frustrating, painful, incomprehensible… basically many different things at different times, and sometimes many different things all at once. It can just be a(n emotional) rollercoaster.

This year, my portfolio has been taking several rollercoaster rides. The ClearPoint Neuro-ride, is one of them. I did ‘warn’ ‘Positive Profit Alert’ (that’s a HK thing) that the stock offers explosive upside return potential… on 2025/01/24, for instance, …

I have not put that much attention on ClearPoint Neuro yet, because the company is still loss-making, and therefore quite risky. Favorable recent developments bring the company a lot closer to the type of maturity where I could see myself holding a much bigger weight. I regard ClearPoint as the single biggest long-term opportunity in my portfolio. In fact, I believe that this one position has the potential to double the overall size of my portfolio over time.

And, here we are with the share price up 78% YTD… and better than a double in the past two weeks or so.

You’d almost forget that the stock plunged by half between February and April. Talk about rollercoasters!

Obviously, with ClearPoint still being early-stage and loss-making, the intervals between the highs and the lows can be a LOT shorter than with mature, profitable businesses. Moreover, the lows can be a lot lower, and the highs a lot higher.

Without positive news and when revenue growth decelerates, the mood can quickly shift towards Glass half empty-scenarios; ‘they may need to raise more capital, and dilute’, ‘the (EV/Sales) valuation (multiple) is so high’, et cetera. In the last almost two weeks, the rollercoaster has been turning aggressively to the highs again. At the moment it’s Glass (more than) half FULL; ‘the company is going to dominate neurology procedures’, ‘it’s the next Intuitive Surgical’… and ‘how is it going to build the capacity to serve thousands and thousands of patients every year?’

It’s just tough holding positions / investing in companies like this. Knowing the company well / having conviction on the prize that awaits at the end, helps withstanding the turbulance. Position-sizing is also critical in creating/maintaining the stamina to complete the ride.

So, what do I do after the 2.5x increase in share price in the past few weeks, now looking at a 20x Price/Sales ratio (or thereabouts)? Nothing! Just enjoying the (long-term) ride. And yes, I am sure there will be a LOT of additional highs and lows ahead.

Yes, nothing. I am doing nothing. One of the key risks to the investment case (to me) has actually been an early acquisition of the company, cutting short the investment return potential. It usually happens to my best positions. I’m still gutted by the UnitedHealth acquisition of Change Healthcare. Sure, it’s nice to get a one-time bump of 40% or so on a day… but not if it cuts short an investment that can compound at high rates of return for a long time. Then, it’s pretty much the worst-case scenario. The best defense against a takeover, is a higher valuation. A USD 800m market cap is still a pittance, but at least it’s better than a USD 400m market cap.

A second big risk with a stock of a high-potential company that is still loss-making and still (likely) requires external growth capital is dilution risk. Tesla was also such a stock. Many years ago, I considered investing in it back when the stock was moving between USD 20-30 per share, and… I didn’t, because I was afraid for dilution in the next unavoidable capital raise. Tesla indeed raised a lot of additional capital. The decisive thing about the capital raise, however, was the price at which the company did it… above USD 90 per share (all from the top of my head, and a loonnnggg time before the stock splits)… instead of in the teens or lower, that I was afraid of. That made a world of difference! Similarly for ClearPoint, the higher the stock price, the cheaper it will be able to access additional funding, and the better the likelihood of wonderful investment returns for earl(y)/(er) investors.

So what about the upside?

Well, I believe there’s a very long runway for the company. Remember, currently ClearPoint guides for cUSD 40m in revenue for 2025. Approval of uniQure’s therapy against Huntington’s (which seems very likely after the recent patient results’ data) alone can double annual revenues.

Now, Huntington’s still has a relatively modest patient population of c41,000 in the U.S. The real BIG revenue jumps kick in, if/when a ClearPoint-supported therapy against a BIG disease hits the market. Parkinson’s for instance has a patient population of 1m people, just in the U.S. ‘Already’ in 2027, we may get the first FDA-approval there.

Every 1,000 additional patients treated through ClearPoint’s delivery method can generate USD 13-20m in incremental revenue, and… those incremental revenues can come in at very high incremental profit margins.

The USD 10bn revenue opportunity for ClearPoint is not a wild assumption, looking some years out, and…

… one of the additional beauties about ClearPoint is that its leadership team - headed by CEO Joe Burnett - has constantly been working on new initiatives to increase the overall total addressable market (TAM), and ClearPoint’s share of that TAM.

The last press release - from 2025/10/01 - once again exemplifies that.

… the development and demonstration of the Company’s proprietary Robotic Neuro-Navigation System. This new product category will enable the ClearPoint Neuro Navigation software to operate the KUKA LBR Med Robotic Arm to support all minimally invasive cranial surgical procedures including cell and gene therapy infusions, laser catheter placement, biopsy workflows and deep brain stimulation and stereotactic EEG lead placements.

Scaling up the capacity to perform brain procedures is one of the key challenges to address the USD 10bn revenue opportunity. There are only about 4,000 practising neurosurgeons in the U.S., and some of the current brain procedures can take up to 12 hours to complete… putting considerable strains on meeting (currently un-)met demand. Further robotization should reduce the capacity limiting factors over time.

2. Jaminvest resources

• Financial models/templates/et cetera

• Portfolio posts

• Stock/Company list

• Tutorials

Read more

Table of Contents

1. Jaminvest resources

2. Portfolio

3. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

4. Disclaimer

5. Footnotes

Read more

Table of Contents

1. Jaminvest resources

2. Portfolio

3. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

4. Disclaimer

5. Footnotes

Read more

Read more

Table of Contents

1. Jaminvest resources

2. Portfolio

3. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

4. Disclaimer

5. Footnotes

Read more

Quick update

Given all the newsflow… somewhat elevated volatility here and there… and my write-ups on Open Lending $LPRO.us (more coming), I felt a couple of quick thoughts on the portfolio could be useful. Updated portfolio tables will follow later.

Read more

Table of Contents

1. Jaminvest resources

2. Portfolio

3. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

4. Disclaimer

5. Footnotes

Read more

Intro

With the sheer number of appetizing opportunities out there at the moment. The challenge is to take the time to dive deeper into specific names, while also filtering out the best opportunities. 😬

I just found out about a company selling an asset for c5x its market cap, and announcing dividends equating to a 150% dividend yield. It’s tough to focus on deep dives with these kind of wonderful distractions. Do keep an eye out for News & Insights #37.

Any how… In this post I go through a couple of small portfolio additions… and do zoom in on (the financials of) three HK stocks…

Read more

Table of Contents

1. Long-tails

2. Jaminvest resources

3. Portfolio

4. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

5. Disclaimer

6. Footnotes

Read more

Table of Contents

1. Dividend income investing

2. The mysterious ‘Others’-line

3. Jaminvest resources

4. Portfolio

5. Hong Kong (sub-)portfolio

6. Disclaimer

7. Footnotes

1. Dividend income investing

1.a. Intro

Since 2021, The portfolio’s dividend income has quadruppled. Last year’s portfolio dividend yield even approached almost 6%! That is quite something, because I did not at all consider myself as a high dividend investor.

1.b. What happened?

Well basically a mix of two things…

1. A strategy to increase dividend income towards a level that covers fixed living expenses, and

2. Mr Market offering double digit (10%+) dividend yield opportunities.

One without the other would probably not have made the same impact of what actually transpired. In a bit, I will tell more about that journey… but first a bit about…

1.c. What’s next?

I do rather like the result of the dividend strategy so far. That means jaminvest will keep being on the lookout to add stocks that can further build and diversify the dividend income stream. Naturally, I prefer to invest in companies with sustainable and growing free cash flows that support the dividend distributions indefinitely… but Mr Market gives what Mr Market gives, like the Tankers 🏷️ trade for instance. If the opportunity is good enough, I’ll happily take a cyclical trade. My main goal is to find additional stocks than can grow to generate at least a 10% annual dividend yield on my cost price.

On the overall portfolio, I would expect that the hidden gems, long tails, compounders - whatever you want to call them - will increase their share of the portfolio over time. That’s usually the simple math because I do not want to become too dependent on individual (higher risk) countries or industries. With that restriction the number of attractive dividend opportunities is usually quite limited in any given year (for my specific portfolio). Moreover, compounders that can re-invest profits at high Returns On Invested Capital (ROIC) should normally see faster share price appreciation vs stocks with a high dividend payout ratio.

1.d. The journey

Read more

Read more

Read more

Excel templates

Before showing some portfolio updates, I like to start this post by introducing a few excel sheet templates that I use to keep tabs on…

• The valuation of the Kazakh companies; Halyk Bank and Kaspi,

• GiG Software’s management guidance,

• A Sum-of-the-Parts of Tianjin Development, and

Read more

Read more

Read more

Read more